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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§78-2a-3(2)(j)(2001). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err by failing to order Olympus Construction, L.C. to 
pay Mr. Matthews' claim as an approved claim pursuant to the provisions of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) because Olympus did not reject the claim in 
writing within 90 days after receipt of the timely filed claim? (R. 1044-1060, 2057-
2075, 2140-2146). 
The trial court's conclusion presents a question of law, which this Court 
reviews for correctness, giving the trial court's determination no deference. See 
Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 13, \ 19, 974 P.2d 288 (whether 
trial court properly applied the law in a particular case is a question of law); Jeffs v. 
Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998) (appellate court reviews legal questions 
under correctness standard), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 1803 (1999); State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) ("Utah case law teaches that 'correctness' means the 
appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the 
trial judge's determination of the law."). 
2. Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment in favor of Olympus 
Construction, L.C. with respect to Mr. Matthews' claim on the ground that such 
claim was barred by the Utah statue of frauds, even though there was an 
uncontroverted sworn statement that an agent of Olympus has admitted Olympus' 
- i -
obligation to pay the $100,000 commission and it was undisputed that written 
documents confirmed the existence of the agency relationship but recited only a 
nominal commission? (R. 2860-2895; 2938-2953). 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In 
reviewing the trial court's ruling, we accept the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the losing party." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,107 
(Utah 1991). Whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law is 
a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 
(Utah 1994) ("Utah case law teaches that 'correctness5 means the appellate court 
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of the law."). 
3. Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment in favor of Olympus 
Construction, L.C. with respect to Mr. Matthews' claim on the ground that such 
claim was barred by the Utah broker licensing statutes, even though the claim for a 
commission was earned and initially payable to a properly licensed real estate 
broker in compliance with the letter and intent of the licensing statutes, but then 
assigned to Mr. Matthews for collection? (R. 2860-2895; 2938-2953). 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In 
reviewing the trial court's ruling, we accept the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the losing party." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 
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(Utah 1991). Whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law is 
a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 
(Utah 1994) ("Utah case law teaches that 'correctness' means the appellate court 
decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of the law."). 
4. Did the trial court err by awarding Olympus Construction, L.C. its 
attorney fees under both UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988) and RULE 56(g), 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, on the grounds that Mr. Matthews' claim was 
without merit, asserted in bad faith, and with the intent to delay, even though 
material issues of disputed fact existed which Mr. Matthews was not permitted to 
pursue at trial, the relevant statutes were reasonably susceptible to the 
interpretations Mr. Matthews advanced, and Mr. Matthews pursued his claim in 
good faith with no intent to delay? (R. 3010-3019). 
The "without merit" determination is a question of law, and therefore is 
reviewed for correctness. Jeschke v. Willis
 9 811 P.2d 202,203 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) ("Utah case law teaches that 
'correctness' means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not 
defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of the law."). The "bad faith" 
determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 
781 P.2d 414,421 (Utah 1989); but cf. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) (stating the "bad faith" determination is a question of fact reviewed 
under the clearly erroneous standard). 
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5. Did the trial court err by awarding Olympus Construction, L.C., the full 
amount of attorney fees claimed, even though such award included compensation to 
the receiver for acting in her capacity as receiver not unlike any other pro se party, 
such award included fees incurred in pursuing an administrative complaint that was 
not necessary or relevant to this judicial proceeding and did not result in any 
enforcement action against Mr. Matthews, and excessive time was spent in 
addressing Mr. Matthews' claim? (R. 3086-3094). 
The amount awarded by the trial court as reasonable attorney fees is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion; however, an award of attorney fees must be 
supported by evidence in the record. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 
988-89 (Utah 1988). However, whether attorney fees are recoverable (i.e., whether 
purported attorney fees are properly classified as attorney fees and properly 
included in an attorney fee award) is question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 2000 UT 46, U 12, 1 P.3d 
1095. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of the issues on appeal involves the interpretation of the 
following statutory provisions: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(1) (2004): 
(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or 
some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by 
the party to be charged with the agreement: 
* * * 
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(e) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or 
broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation^] 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(l)—(4) (2001): 
(1) A dissolved company in winding up may dispose of the known 
claims against it by following the procedures described in this section. 
(2) A company in winding up electing to dispose of known claims 
pursuant to this section may give written notice of the company's 
dissolution to known claimants at any time after the effective date of 
dissolution. The written notice must: 
(a) describe the information that must be included in a claim; 
(b) provide an address to which written notice of any claim 
must be given to the company; 
(c) state the deadline, which may not be fewer than 120 days 
after the effective date of the notice, by which the dissolved company 
must receive the claim; and 
(d) state that, unless sooner barred by another state statute 
limiting actions, the claim will be barred if not received by the 
deadline. 
(3) Unless sooner barred by another statute limiting actions, a 
claim against the dissolved company is barred if: 
(a) a claimant was given notice under Subsection (2) and the 
claim is not received by the dissolved company by the deadline; or 
(b) the dissolved company delivers to the claimant written 
notice of rejection of the claim within 90 days after receipt of the 
claim and the claimant whose claim was rejected by the dissolved 
company does not commence a proceeding to enforce the claim 
within 90 days after the effective date of the rejection notice. 
(4) Claims which are not rejected by the dissolved company in 
writing within 90 days after receipt of the claim by the dissolved 
company shall be considered approved. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2-10(1) (1996): 
(1) It is unlawful for any associate broker or sales agent to accept 
valuable consideration for the performance of any of the acts specified 
in this chapter from any person except the principal broker with whom 
he is affiliated and licensed. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2-18(1985): 
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in any court of this 
state for the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation for any 
act done or service rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to 
other than licensed principal brokers, unless the person was duly 
licensed as a principal broker at the time of the doing of the act or 
rendering of the service. 
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for 
the recovery of a fee, commission, or compensation for services as a 
sales agent or associate broker unless the action is against the 
principal broker with whom he is or was licensed. Any action for the 
recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation may only be 
instituted and brought by the principal broker with whom the sales 
agent or associate broker is affiliated. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56(1) (1988): 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees 
to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense 
to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith[.] 
RULE 56(c), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
(c). . . The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
RULE 56(g), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
(g) If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court 
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shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other 
party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the 
affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In January of 2002 a petition for judicial dissolution of Olympus 
Construction, L.C. ("Olympus") was filed. (R. 1-6). Initially a custodian was 
appointed for Olympus. (R. 504-506). On August 21,2002, a Decree of Judicial 
Dissolution of Olympus was entered and the custodian was converted to a receiver 
for the purpose of winding up the business and affairs of Olympus. (R. 589-591). 
On May 6, 2003, Annette Jarvis was appointed as the successor receiver for 
Olympus and continues to act as its receiver today. (R. 771-778). 
On February 26, 2004, the trial court entered an order pursuant to the request 
of Olympus setting June 30,2004 as the date by which written notice of claims 
must be submitted pursuant to the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 
(2001), or be forever barred as set forth in the statute. (R. 843-863). 
On June 30, 2004, David C. Matthews timely filed a Notice of Claim 
asserting that he was entitled to payment of a $100,000 commission arising from the 
previous purchase of a parcel of real property in Summit County, Utah by Olympus. 
(R. 968). 
The 90-day period to reject timely filed claims as set forth in UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001) expired on September 28, 2004, without Olympus 
rejecting Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim. 
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On November 10, 2004, Olympus filed a motion requesting permission to 
repay loans to members of Olympus. (R. 988-995). Mr. Matthews opposed that 
motion, arguing that UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1308 (2001) requires payment to 
third-party creditors prior to any payments to members in a dissolution proceeding, 
and therefore his claim should be paid first as an approved claim pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001). (R. 996-1002). 
On November 18, 2004, Olympus filed a motion requesting that a future date 
be set as a deadline by which Olympus would still be able to reject timely filed 
claims. (R. 1021-1038). Mr. Matthews opposed that motion on the grounds that the 
statutory deadline for Olympus to reject timely filed claims had already expired as 
set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001), and Mr. Matthews filed a 
motion requesting that the trial court order Olympus to pay his claim as an approved 
claim. (R. 1044-1060). Ultimately the trial court rejected Mr. Matthews' argument 
that his claim should be paid as an approved claim, and pursuant to Olympus' 
request set a future date by which Olympus was required to reject timely filed 
claims. (R. 2085-2091, 2140-2146). 
Olympus subsequently rejected Mr. Matthews' claim on April 14, 2005, 
which was within the extended time period established by the trial court. (R. 2147-
2156). Pursuant to the procedure established by the trial court, Mr. Matthews filed 
a Claim Response on April 15, 2005 (R. 2187-2189) and an Amended Claim 
Response on May 12, 2005 (R. 2246-2259) in order to continue to pursue his claim 
notwithstanding the rejection thereof by Olympus. 
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On December 20, 2005, the trial court entered an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Olympus as to Mr. Matthews5 claim on the grounds that such 
claim was barred by the Utah broker licensing statutes and the statute of frauds. (R. 
3037-3039). 
On July 12, 2006, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of 
law to the effect that Olympus was entitled to an award of attorney fees from Mr. 
Matthews pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988) and RULE 56(g), UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE on the grounds that Mr. Matthews' pursuit of his claim 
was without merit, in bad faith, and for purposes of delay. (R. 3119-3137). On July 
20, 2006, the trial court entered an order awarding Olympus a total of $25,112.50 in 
attorney fees from Mr. Matthews. (R. 3155-3286). 
This appeal was then commenced on August 9, 2006. (R. 3320-3321). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At all times relevant to the real estate commission that is the subject of Mr. 
Matthews' claim, he was properly licensed in the State of Utah as a real estate agent 
and was affiliated with Fred B. Law of Re-Max Brokers, L.C. as his supervising 
principal broker. (R. 2946-2948, 3111-3112). 
In June of 1998, Olympus retained the services of Mr. Matthews and Re-
Max Brokers, L.C. in relation to the acquisition of a parcel of property in Summit 
County, Utah by Olympus. A Real Estate Purchase Contract for that purchase was 
entered into on August 26, 1998, with a purchase price of $3,000,000 (R.2685-
2696), and the purchase closed on December 3, 1998 (R. 2702-2703). At the 
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closing, Re-Max Brokers, L.C. was paid a nominal commission for its services in 
the amount of $200. (R. 2703-2704). It was agreed that Olympus would pay Re-
Max Brokers, L.C. a $100,000 commission in compensation for its services in 
assisting Olympus to acquire the property, but, in light of Olympus' limited cash 
flow at the time of purchase, that commission was deferred and payable when 
Olympus sold the property. (R. 2883-2884). The property was not sold until the 
latter part of 2003 as part of the judicial dissolution proceedings. (R. 779-790). 
In 1999, Mr. Matthews and his wife Jane (who had previously acted as an 
associate broker for Re-Max Brokers, L.C), terminated their business relationship 
with Fred B. Law as their supervising principal broker, and Jane Matthews became 
licensed as a principal broker. At that time, Mr. Law assigned to Jane Matthews his 
right to collect the $100,000 commission from Olympus. (R. 2946-2948). Jane 
Matthews subsequently assigned to Mr. Matthews her right to collect the $100,000 
commission from Olympus. (R. 2942-2944, 2946-2948, 3111-3112). This 
$100,000 commission is the subject of Mr. Matthews' claim against Olympus in 
this case. (R. 968). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Olympus purposely availed itself of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 48-
2c-1305 (2001) to dispose of known claims by third-party creditors. Governing law 
and the orders entered by the trial court consistently reference Section 48-2c-1305 
as the statute governing the disposal of claims by known third-party creditors 
against Olympus, including Mr. Matthews' claim. The plain language of Section 
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48-2c-1305(4) states that if Olympus does not reject Mr. Matthews' timely filed 
claim within 90 days of receipt thereof then Mr. Matthews' claim shall be 
considered approved. By failing to reject Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim within 
the 90-day rejection period mandated by statute, Olympus has irrevocably approved 
Mr. Matthews' claim and should summarily be required to promptly pay the same 
without further inquiry. This single issue is dispositive of all remaining issues if 
decided in favor of Mr. Matthews. 
There are disputed issues of material fact that preclude the grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Olympus based on the statute of frauds. The Real Estate 
Purchase Contract and Settlement Statement have been signed on behalf of 
Olympus and establish a brokerage relationship between Olympus and Re-Max 
Brokers, L.C. in satisfaction of the statute of frauds. The oral modification of these 
documents to the effect that Olympus would subsequently pay Re-Max Brokers, 
L.C. a $100,000 commission is enforceable pursuant to the well-established 
exception to the statute of frauds that Olympus has admitted the existence of the 
oral agreement to pay the $100,000 commission. This disputed issue of fact should 
only be resolved at trial. 
The purpose and intent of the licensing statutes—the protection of the public 
with respect to real estate transactions—has been fully satisfied because the 
$100,000 commission was properly earned and initially payable to a licensed 
principal broker in full compliance with the Utah broker licensing statutes. The 
subsequent assignment of the right to collect the $100,000 commission to someone 
-77-
other than a licensed principal broker should not affect the ability of the assignee to 
collect the commission because, pursuant to well-established Utah law on 
assignments in general, Mr. Matthews as an assignee stands in the shoes of, and has 
the same rights as, Mr. Law (a principal broker) as the assignor, with respect to 
collection of the commission. Other states with similar licensing statutes have 
expressly approved the collection of commissions by an assignee from a principal 
broker. Even Utah has recognized similar common law exceptions to the licensing 
statutes relating to the collection of compensation by unlicensed contractors. 
There is no sufficient legal basis for an attorney fee award to Olympus. 
There is no applicable contractual attorney fee provision that would entitle Olympus 
to recover attorney fees merely because it was the prevailing party. An award of 
attorney fees is not warranted under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 (1998) because 
Mr. Matthews' claim had merit and was pursued in good faith. An award of 
attorney fees is not warranted under RULE 56(g), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE because the subject affidavits, although initially in error due to the 
faulty memory of the affiants, were subsequently corrected, and were not presented 
with the intent to delay or hinder the proceedings and in fact no delay arose 
therefrom. 
Any attorney fees ultimately awarded to Olympus, if any, should not include: 
(1) attorney fees associated with compensation to the receiver for acting in her 
capacity as receiver not unlike any other pro se party; (2) attorney fees incurred in 
pursuing an administrative complaint which was not relevant to, and had no bearing 
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upon, Mr. Mathews5 claim against Olympus in the dissolution proceeding; or (3) 
attorney fees generated by excessive time spent in addressing Mr. Matthews' claim 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING MR. MATTHEWS5 
ARGUMENT THAT HIS CLAIM SHOUD BE DEEMED APPROVED 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001). 
In granting Olympus summary judgment, the trial court rejected Mr. 
Matthews' argument that his claim should have been deemed approved—because 
Olympus did not deny it within the period required by statute—and thus should 
have been paid. As explained below, that was error. 
A. Governing law and the orders entered by the trial court 
consistently reference UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) as the 
proper method to address known claims against Olympus. 
The genesis of these legal proceedings is a judicial dissolution proceeding 
pursuant to the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act (Chapter 2c of Title 
48 of the Utah Code) whereby Olympus was dissolved and its business affairs 
woundup. (R. 1-6). UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1213(2) (2001), which expressly 
addresses a judicial decree of dissolution, states: 
After entering the decree of dissolution, the court shall direct the 
winding up and liquidation of the company's business and affairs in 
accordance with Part 13. 
Accordingly, it does not matter if the dissolution proceedings are pursuant to 
a judicial dissolution or a non-judicial dissolution, the winding up of the dissolved 
company's business and affairs is governed by Part 13, which includes Section 48-
2c-1305 of the Utah Code. As part of the judicial dissolution proceedings here, the 
trial court appointed a receiver to wind up the affairs of Olympus. Notably, 
nowhere in UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1212 (2001), which authorizes the trial court 
to appoint a receiver for a dissolved company in a judicial dissolution proceeding, is 
there any suggestion that the trial court may alter the statutory procedures and 
deadlines otherwise in force with respect to dissolution of the company. In fact, 
Paragraph 4 of the Successor Receiver Order entered on May 6,2003, which 
appoints Annette Jarvis as the successor receiver in place of Alan Funk, states: 
Except as otherwise provided herein the Receiver may dispose of 
known and unknown claims against Olympus by notice and/or 
publication, may set dates for the barring of such claims and may 
accept or reject claims all as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-
1305 and 1306. 
(R. 773) (emphasis added). 
It is noteworthy that the May 6, 2003 Successor Receiver Order only 
referenced the setting of dates for the barring of claims, and further referenced the 
fact that the claims would be accepted or rejected as provided by statute. No 
provision was made for Olympus to come back to the trial court at some arbitrary 
time in the future to set a date by which Olympus must reject timely claims. This is 
consistent with the referenced statutes in that a date has to be established as a 
deadline for the submission of claims, but once the claim-bar date has been set the 
acceptance or rejection of claims is governed by the referenced statutes and the time 
periods set forth therein. Olympus expressly relied upon the language from the 
May 6, 2003 Successor Receiver Order quoted above and the provisions of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) in subsequently filing a motion with the trial court 
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to establish a claim-bar date. (R. 791-794). The trial court then granted that 
motion, all in accordance with the provisions of UTAH CODE Ann. § 48-2c-1305 
(2001). (R. 843-863). 
B. The plain language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001) 
mandates that Olympus reject timely filed claims within 90 days 
of receipt or such claims shall be considered approved. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) sets forth a very specific procedure 
for addressing and disposing of known claims against a dissolved company. First, 
the dissolved company gives "written notice of the company's dissolution to known 
claimants," which explains that a known claim must be submitted in writing to the 
company by a specified date or, "unless sooner barred by another state statute 
limiting actions, the claim will be barred if not received by the deadline." § 48-2c-
1305(2). The written notice must also "describe the information that must be 
included in a claim" and "provide an address to which written notice of any claim 
must be given to the company." Id. If a written claim is not submitted to the 
company on or before the deadline set forth in the written notice, then the claimant 
is forever barred from pursuing the claim against the dissolved company. § 48-2c-
1305(3). 
If "the dissolved company delivers to the claimant written notice of rejection 
of the claim within 90 days after receipt of the claim," the claimant is then required 
"to commence a proceeding to enforce the claim within 90 days after the effective 
date of the rejection notice" or once again the claimant will be forever barred from 
pursuing the claim against the dissolved company. Id. However, "[cjlaims which 
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are not rejected by the dissolved company in writing within 90 days after receipt of 
the claim by the dissolved company shall be considered approved." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 48-2c-1305(4) (2001). 
The claim-bar date requested by Olympus and approved by the trial court 
was June 30,2004. Order Granting Receiver's Motion for Declaratory Relief and 
Establishing a Claim-Bar Date and a Claim Filing Procedure, February 26, 2004, f^ 
3, at p. 2. (R. 844). Mr. Matthews timely filed his claim against Olympus on June 
30,2004. Notice of Claim, filed June 30, 2004. (R. 968). Ninety days from the 
date of Olympus' receipt of Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim was September 28, 
2004. However, Olympus did not reject Mr. Matthews' claim in writing until April 
14, 2005, nine-and-a-half months after he filed it, and well outside of the 90-day 
rejection period plainly prescribed by statute. Receiver's Objection to Claim of 
David C. Matthews, filed April 14, 2005. (R. 2147-2156). 
The first question is whether the trial court correctly construed Section 48-
2c-1305(4) when it rejected Mr. Matthews' contention that his claim should have 
been deemed approved based on Olympus' failure to reject the claim within the 
statutory period. "'In construing any statute, [this court] examine[s] the statute's 
plain language and resort[s] to other methods of statutory interpretation[ ] only if 
the language is ambiguous. Accordingly, [the court] read[s] the words of a statute 
literally . . . and give[s] the words their usual and accepted meaning.'" Anglin v. 
Contracting Fabrication Mack, Inc., 2001 UT App 341,19, 37 P.3d 267 (quoting 
Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 2000 UT App 372, \ 9,21 P.3d 231 
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(internal quotations omitted)). "In so doing, [the court] cassume[s] that each term 
was used advisedly by the legislature.'" Id. (quoting Biddle v. Washington Terrace 
City, 1999 UT 110, f 14, 993 P.2d 875. "When interpreting a statute, it is axiomatic 
that this court's primary goal 'is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of 
the purpose that the statute was meant to achieve.'" Id., f 11 (quoting Biddle, 1999 
UT 110, f 13 (internal quotations omitted)). 
Section 48-2c-1305 is identical to UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1406 (1992) 
(which deals with the disposition of known claims by a dissolved corporation). 
However, the interpretation and application of these statutes has not been the 
subject of any reported opinion in Utah. These Utah statutory provisions are 
somewhat unique and there does not appear to be any similar provision in any 
model act or other state code.1 
However, it is not necessary to look beyond the plain language of the statute 
in order to ascertain the meaning and application of the term "shall be considered 
approved." In reading these words literally, and giving them their usual and 
accepted meaning, Mr. Matthews' claim should have been considered approved and 
should have been paid without any further inquiry. The fact that the claim is 
"considered approved" simply distinguishes this set of circumstances from a 
1
 The model acts on which UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-1406 (1992) and UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 48-2c-1305 (2001) are based do not contain a provision similar to 
subsection (4) of these two Utah Code sections. MODEL REVISED BUSINESS 
CORPORATION ACT § 14.06 (1984); UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 
807(1996). 
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situation in which a dissolved company affirmatively accepts or admits the 
company's obligation to pay a claim. Rather than the claim being approved 
pursuant to the affirmative act of the company, the claim is "considered approved" 
or deemed approved as a matter of law because the company failed to reject the 
claim in writing within the statutorily prescribed time limit. The end result in both 
situations is the same: the claim must be paid. This result is consistent with the 
apparent purpose that the statute was meant to achieve: an efficient method for 
addressing and disposing of known claims by a dissolved company to bring about 
finality to the company's business and affairs. 
C. Summary. 
Section 48-2c-1305 makes it clear that the procedure set forth therein has the 
same effect as a statute of limitations, and if a claim is not timely submitted to the 
dissolved company then the claim is forever barred without the need for any further 
inquiry as to the merits of the claim. The limiting nature of Section 48-2c-1305 on 
claims against dissolved companies cuts both ways. If the dissolved company does 
not reject in writing a timely filed claim within 90 days after the dissolved 
company's receipt of that claim, then the dissolved company is forever barred from 
disputing the claim further and the claim is "considered approved." Thus, both the 
dissolved company and the claimant are on equal footing and control their own 
destinies with respect to their ability to pursue or defend against a claim. If the 
claimant misses the deadline to file the claim, the claim is barred; if the dissolved 
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company misses the deadline to reject the claim, the claim is approved and should 
be paid. If both the claimant and the dissolved company comply with the statutory 
deadlines, then the claimant still has an opportunity to assert its claim in a legal 
proceeding, and the dissolved company still has an opportunity to defend against 
that claim. 
It would be manifestly unjust, and contrary to the plain language of the 
statute, to allow Olympus to be excused from its clear failure to reject Mr. 
Matthews' timely filed claim within 90 days after its receipt thereof, especially 
when Mr. Matthews' claim indisputably would have been forever barred had he 
failed to timely file his claim. In short, the trial court erred in failing to apply the 
plain language of Section 48-2c-1305(4) to Mr. Matthews' claim. Accordingly, this 
Court should reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of Olympus and remand 
with directions to the trial court to enter an order requiring Olympus to summarily 
pay the full amount of Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim as an approved claim, due 
to the failure of Olympus to timely reject the claim in writing as mandated by 
statute. 
If this Court grants that relief, all of the other aspects of the trial court's 
judgment that Mr. Matthews challenges must also be reversed. If, however, the 
Court does not grant that relief, the trial court—for the reasons set forth below— 
erred in granting summary judgment and an award of attorney fees against Mr. 
Matthews. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING OLYMPUS 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
In granting Olympus summary judgment based on the statute of frauds, the 
trial court ignored a genuine dispute as to material fact, i.e., whether a 
representative of Olympus had admitted the obligation to pay the $100,000 
commission to Mr. Matthews. As explained below, that was error. 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In 
reviewing the trial court's ruling, we accept the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the losing party." Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,107 
(Utah 1991). "[I]t only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the 
averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact." 
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). "It is not the purpose of 
the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of 
parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is it to deny parties the 
right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact." Id. 
A. The Real Estate Purchase Contract and Settlement Statement 
satisfy the statute of frauds. 
Pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4(l)(e) (2004), the statute of frauds 
merely requires that "every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker 
to purchase or sell real estate for compensation" be in writing and signed by the 
party to be charged. The required written agreement establishing the broker 
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relatioi ishipdoes not necessarily 1 lave to b 3 a standai dfo t m l listing Agreen :iei it, 1: i it 
may be expressed in a number of ways, including as part of another document. 
Pages 2 and 3 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract dated August 26, 1998, 
whereby Olympus contracted I tlu ^il- ri : i riles 
David Matthews as the agent representing both the buyer and the seller as a limited 
agent 2868-2869). Line 700 on page 2 of the Settlement Statement dated 
December 3, 1998, which Olympus signed in conjunction villi its acquisition of I k 
subject property, plainly identifies Re/Max (shorthand for Re-Max Brokers, L.C., 
the brokerage operated by Fred B. Law as principal broker) as the listing broker. 
(R. 2881). Accordingly, the combination of the Real Estate Puniiasc t "nnintd an J 
the Settlement Statement satisfy the statute frauds requirement that any "agreement 
•• M !zmy >,)i employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation" be reduced to writing. UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5 4(l)(e) (I Itah 
2004). 
' Ill1 z re is nc gem line dispi ite that a brokerage relationship between Olympus 
on the one hand, and Re-Max Brokers, L.C. and Mr. Matthews on the othe i: hand, 
was memorialized in writing as required by the statute of frauds. Indeed, even 
I >l' minus lias esscnlulh < oin nl* u! Ih ill ,ltiu" RH't \ Commission Check, and 
Settlement Statement indicate only that Mathews, through his brokerage, Re-Max, 
was to be paid (and was paid) a total of $200.00 in 'Sales/Broker's Commission."5 
MemoniiiifiJii'i of I .IV, in Support ol Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment to 
Disallow Claim of David C. Matthews, filed July 6, 2005, at p. :>. 
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most, the Supporting Documents indicate only that Matthews served as a 'limited' 
agent for both buyer and seller in connection with the December 1998 transaction, 
and that the real estate office with which he was associated, Re-Max Brokers, L.C., 
was paid a total of $200.00 as the full commission for the transaction." Reply in 
Support of Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment to Disallow Claim of David 
C. Matthews, filed August 26, 2005, at p. 3. (R. 2905). 
However, the crux of Mr. Matthews' claim and the statute of frauds defense 
asserted by Olympus is that there was an oral modification of the brokerage 
agreement whereby an agent of Olympus promised to pay Mr. Matthews and his 
brokerage an additional $100,000 commission related to Olympus' acquisition of 
the subject property, however that commission was to be deferred until Olympus 
subsequently sold the property (which is why the $100,000 commission was not 
referenced in the Settlement Statement). Even though the promise to pay the 
$100,000 commission was not reduced to writing, a well-established exception to 
the statute of frauds applies to this admitted oral modification of the brokerage 
agreement. 
B. An agent of Olympus has admitted the commission is owed. 
The statute of frauds "is not to prevent the performance or the enforcement 
of oral contracts that have in fact been made; it is not to create a loophole of escape 
for dishonest repudiators." English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 616 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting 2 Corbin on Contracts § 498 (1950)). 
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The statute of frauds is a defense that can be waived by a failure to 
plead it as an affirmative defense, admitting its existence in the 
pleadings, or admitting at trial the existence and all essential terms of 
the contract. Since a purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent 
fraud and perjury on the part of one claiming that another had [entered 
into the subject transaction] . . . , the one opposing the claim cannot 
complain if he admits the existence of the [subject transaction] . . . . 
"It cannot give a court any great satisfaction to permit a defendant to 
escape from performing a contract he admits he has made." 
L.P. Bentley v. Potter, 694 P.2d 617, 621 (Utah 1984) (quoting 2 Corbin on 
Contracts § 320 at 153 (1950)) (other numerous citations omitted). 
Olwiipir I'i " <1 lhivtii};Ji Rii huh.] la flu (an ap,!11 < I I ilynipu.s lh.it I'uikliiMi rl 
virtually all of Olympus' business dealings at the time), promised to pay Mr. 
Matthews and his brokerage the $100,000 commission on a deferred basis as an 
incentive for Is lit: M a t t h e w s a r :-* •- ^kerage to assist (31) mpi is in pi irehasing the 
subject property. This obligation has subsequently been admitted numerous times 
in front of multiple third-parties such that "there is no serious possibility that the 
assertion tul'tlic |$ il IIIIjHill ia<inniiissu>i11 v\ taKe" and niinrcniicnt oi Hkh 
agreement as demonstrated by the various documents and "as supplemented by the 
oral agreement [regarding the $100,000 commission is] not barred by the statute 
of frauds." English, 814P.2dat 617 ( >l > i ipu,. .imph i .nmnl link In hiinl (he 
statute of frauds to avoid an admitted liability. 
A sworn affidavit of Mr. Matthews has been filed herein in which he 
explains: 
5. In 1998,1 represented Olympus Construction, L.C. 
("Olympus") in negotiating the purchase of certain real property in 
Park City, Utah which was the subject of a Real Estate Purchase 
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Contract between Olympus and Joseph W. Groutage III, dated on or 
about August 26, 1998. 
6. Richard Jaffa negotiated the acquisition of the property on 
behalf of Olympus with little or no involvement by his son, Scott 
Jaffa; after the purchase had been negotiated Scott Jaffa simply signed 
the purchase documents at the direction of his father. 
7. The above-referenced real estate transaction was similar to 
many business transactions in which Olympus was involved of which 
I am aware—anyone who wanted to do business with Olympus dealt 
directly with Richard Jaffa, not his son Scott Jaffa, and as a matter of 
course Scott Jaffa would sign whatever documents he was instructed 
to sign by his father. 
8. In connection with the acquisition of the subject property by 
Olympus as referenced above, Richard Jaffa, acting on behalf of 
Olympus, represented that Olympus would pay Re/Max a $100,000 
commission (the "Commission"), which would be deferred and paid 
upon the subsequent sale of the subject property by Olympus for cash 
flow reasons. 
9. The promise on behalf of Olympus to Re/Max to pay the 
Commission was initially made prior to the closing of the acquisition 
of the property by Olympus. 
10. Subsequent to the closing of the acquisition of the property 
by Olympus, Richard Jaffa has admitted on a number of occasions to 
myself and a number of other individuals, who were not involved in 
the subject transaction and who are not involved with either Olympus 
or Re/Max, the obligation of Olympus to pay the Commission. 
Affidavit of David C. Matthews, dated August 9, 2005. (R. 2858; 2884-2885). 
At the very least, for purposes of summary judgment there are genuinely 
disputed issues of material fact as to (1) whether an oral promise to pay the 
$100,000 commission was made, and (2) whether Richard Jaffa was authorized to 
bind Olympus to pay the $100,000 commission pursuant to his oral promise, and all 
facts and inferences arising therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
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!\Ii. Matthews. The trial court erred in granting Olympus summary judgment 
notwithstanding these disputed issues of fact. This < • O ; 
court's judgment in favor of Olympus and remand with directions that a trial be 
held to resolve the disputed issues of fact regarding the oral promise to pay. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING OL¥MPUS 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE BROKER LICENSING 
STATUTES. 
In granting Olympus summary judgment, the trial court rejected Mr. 
Matthews' argument that he was entitled \ - -4 *he shoes of his assignor, 
Fred B. Law, for purposes of collecting the $100,000 commission. As 
explained below, that was error. 
The Utah broker licensing statutes relied upon l>y < Mympus mc as 
follows: 
It is unlawful for any associate broker or sales agent to accept 
valuable consideration for the performance of any of the acts specified 
in this chapter from any person except the principal broker with whom 
he is affiliated and licensed. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2-10(1) (1996). 
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in any court of this 
state for the recovery of a commission, fee, or compensation for any 
act done or service rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to 
other than licensed principal brokers, unless the person was duly 
licensed as a principal broker at the time of the doing of the act or 
rendering of the service. 
(2) No sales agent or associate broker may sue in his own name for 
the recovery of a fee, commission, or compensation for services as a 
sales agent or associate broker unless the action is against the 
principal broker with whom he is or was licensed. Any action for the 
recovery of a fee, commission, or other compensation may only be 
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instituted and brought by the principal broker with whom the sales 
agent or associate broker is affiliated. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2-18 (1996). 
However, there is no genuine dispute that the subject commission was 
initially earned and payable to Fred B. Law, as the properly licensed 
principal broker with whom Mr. Matthews was affiliated at the time through 
Re-Max Brokers, L.C. Affidavit of Fred B. Law, dated October 19, 2005. 
(R. 2946-2948). Had Mr. Law been the claimant in this matter, there would 
not be an issue involving the Utah broker licensing statutes. However, the 
issue has arisen as to whether a commission once properly earned and 
payable to a licensed principal broker can subsequently be assigned to a non-
broker for purposes of collection (Mr. Law assigned the right to collect the 
commission to Jane Matthews, who subsequently assigned it Mr. Matthews). 
While there is no Utah case law specifically addressing an assignment of a 
principal broker's right to collect a commission under UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2-18 
(1985), the established Utah law on assignments in general is that "[a]n assignment 
of an interest in a contract gives the assignee the same rights as the assignor." West 
One Bank, Utah v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 887 P.2d 880, n3 at p. 883 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) (quoting Jack B. Parson Co. v. Nield, 751 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah 
1988)). In other words, the assignee stands in the same shoes as the assignor, and 
has the same rights as the assignor. Accordingly, as an assignee of Mr. Law's right 
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to collect the commission, Mr. Matthews stands in the same shoes as Mr . Law and 
I uiilil lii" iiilllii I I i allVct tin' I'iihinmissioii, ' . . '•; ' " • •'. 
Utah courts have expressly addressed the intent of the broker licensing 
statutes. ; , Utah Supreme Court has explained: 
It is apparent that the [broker licensing] statutes were enacted . . . to 
provide for registration and regulation of those engaged in the real 
estate b u s i n e s s . . . . In Koeberle v. Hotchkiss, 8 Cal. App. 2d 6 3 4 , 4 8 
P.2d 104, 107, Justice Crail stated: "The primary purpose of the Real 
Estate Broker s ' Act was to require real estate brokers and salesmen to 
be 'honest, truthful and of good reputation. '" 
Andersen v. Johnson, 160 P.2d 725, 727 (Utah 1945). In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Wade of the Utah Supreme Court expressly stated: 
A reading of the statutes regulating real estate brokers makes it 
apparent they were enacted for the benefit of the public to protect 
them from dishonest and unscrupulous real estate agents. 
Id. at 730 (quoted wi th approval in Diversified Gen. Corp. v. White Barn Golf 
Course, Im • , 58- 1 1 > 2d 8 = 18, 850 (I Jt ill 19 ; 8) ' , ' ' • . • 
As long as a commission is fully earned and payable to a licensed principal 
broker, then the purpose and intent of the broker licensing statutes (the protection of 
I lie ]MIIII"!H I litis bcL-n satisfied. v ••• ,iU -,M . *\ un » n ummission 
that has been assigned to an individual who is not licensed as a principal broker is 
not contrary to the spirit and intent of the licensing statutes. 
The Utah cases discussed above are consistent with the decisions • :>f other 
courts faced with similar real estate licensing statutes that have expressly 
recognized the right of an assignee to sue and assert the same rights as the assigning 
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real estate broker. For example, Section 4735.21 of the Ohio Revised Code states: 
"No right of action shall accrue to any person, partnership, association or 
corporation for the performance of the acts mentioned in section 4735.01 of the 
Revised Code, without alleging and proving that such person, partnership, 
association or corporation was licensed as a real estate broker . . . . " In Ritchie v. 
Weston, Inc., 757 N.E.2d 835 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001), the Ohio Court of Appeals 
upheld the right of a real estate agent to sue for a commission based upon an 
assignment of the commission to the agent from the principal broker. In issuing its 
ruling, the Ohio Court of Appeals explained that an assignee "stands in the shoes of 
the assignor." Id. at 837. The court further reasoned: 
Standing in the shoes of another means that the assignee stands in the 
shoes of the assignor or subrogor and succeeds to all the rights and 
remedies of the latter. There is no question that Grubb & Ellis is a 
licensed broker and had the right to bring this action, so the 
prerequisites of R.C. 4735.21 had been satisfied. As assignee, Ritchie 
therefore held the same right to bring the cause of action as Grubb & 
Ellis. 
Id. 
Similarly, in Hodge v. Kun, 868 F.2d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals observed that "[u]nder Arizona law, a licensed real estate 
salesman who has been assigned his broker's right to a commission arguably is 
entitled to sue the principal directly for the commission." 
The bottom line is that as a result of the assignment from Mr. Law to Jane 
Matthews, and the subsequent assignment from Jane Matthews to Mr. Matthews, 
Mr. Matthews now stands in the shoes of Mr. Law as the principal broker at the 
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time the obligation to pay the commission arose, and Mr. Matthews is entitled to 
pursue collection of the commission directly from Olympus in h i >\ < nvn nn 11 m • \ 
contrary holding by this Court would have far-reaching implications. 
For example, if a principal broker desired to retire and wind down their 
business operations, if the principal broker was barred J * -\ assigning earned bi it 
unpaid commissions to anyone other than principal brokers, the retiring principal 
; . ••(/(" may ha\e .1 difficult time receiving fair value for the uncollected 
commissions. This problem would be exacerbated in the event ,1 principal broker 
becomes incapacitated or dies, because the heirs of the deceased principal broker 
cajutu»( Icyd II > n illect any earned but unpaid commissions, and it is highly unlikely 
that the heirs would be able to obtain fair value for the uncollected commissions in 
attempting to assign the right of collection to other principal brokers. The 
pi ote ction of tl le pi iblic in dealing with real estate brokers in real estate transactions 
(the express purpose of the broker licensing statutes) is not served by si icli a i esi lit 
While no appellate court in the State of Utah has expressly addressed the 
. i b 1 1 1 1 \ o I . 1 1 1 i mi 1 1 1 1 \ I i , in II * I i s i in i i I licensed as a broker to collect a commission, 
Utah courts have addressed the ability of an individual who is not licensed as a 
contractor to collect payment for services that can only be performed by a licensed 
contractor. Similar In I In.- broker licensing statutes, UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-55-604 
(1994) prohibits the maintenance of an action for the collection of compensation for 
performing any act that requires a contractor's license unless the contractor 
piii si ling tl le action alleges and proves th... ..:y were properly licensed as a 
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contractor when the alleged cause of action arose. Nevertheless, Utah courts have 
recognized a common law exception to the licensing statutes which allows recovery 
by unlicensed contractors when it can be proven that the purpose of the licensing 
statute—the protection of the public—was satisfied. See, e.g., A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumb. & Heat. v. Aspen Constr., 199 UT App 87, ffi| 14-21, 977 P.2d 518 (setting 
forth four distinct sets of circumstances in which a contractor may recover even 
though the contractor is not properly licensed because the purposes of the licensing 
statute are otherwise satisfied). 
In this case, the purposes of the broker licensing statutes were fully satisfied 
in that the commission was initially earned by, and properly payable to, a licensed 
principal broker, who subsequently assigned the right to collect the commission. 
Similar to the results obtained in creating a common law exception to the contractor 
licensing statute by Utah courts, an assignee of a principal broker should be allowed 
to collect a real estate commission notwithstanding the assignee's status as an 
unlicensed broker. 
The trial court erred by refusing to allow Mr. Matthews to assert a claim for 
the real estate commission as an assignee of Mr. Law (a licensed principal broker). 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's judgment and declare that an 
assignee of a licensed principal broker may be allowed to collect a real estate 
commission properly earned by the principal broker. 
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO 
OLYMPUS. 
In awarding attorney fees to Olympus, the trial court determined that Mr. 
Matthews' claim had no merit and was pursued in bad faith. As explained below, 
In most every judicial proceeding, one party will prevail over the other to 
some extent. However, the mere fact that a court rejects a claim made by a 
party to an award of attorney fees absent either a contractual provision expressly 
authorizing an attorney fee award or a statutory provision authorizing an attorney 
fee award based up t n very specific facts and CirCUP": i J*"- >. **. H i I '/\ Is '• \ Campbell 
v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Utah 1991). 
The trial court awarded attorney fees to Olympus based on RULE 56(g), 
UTAH RULES OF CIVII PROCEDURE and UTAI i CODE ANN. § 78 27-56 (1988); 
however, the trial court failed to identify the amount of fees specifically awardable 
under Rule 56(g), and simply awarded a lump sum of attorney fees based jointly on 
R i ile 56(g) and Section 78-27-56 of the I Jtah Code I Endings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Concerning Receiver's Motion for Attorney Fees Relating to 
Claim of David C. Matthews, entered June 12, 2006; Order and Judgment Granting 
Attorney Fee Award Against David C. Matthews, entered Inly 2u, 2000, ( R. 31 ?2-
3137,3155-3286). 
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A. An award of attorney fees is not warranted under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988). 
1. Standard applicable to an award of attorney fees. 
Section 78-27-56 clearly states, however, that the court shall award 
attorney fees to the prevailing party only if it determines (1) that the 
action is without merit and (2) that the action was brought in bad 
faith. 
Vatkiss, 808 P.2d at 1068. 
There is a distinction between being the prevailing party (which is usually all 
that is required for an attorney fee award pursuant to a contractual attorney fee 
provision) and an attorney fee award pursuant to Section 78-27-56 because the 
claim was (1) without merit and (2) pursued in bad faith. "A party may bring a 
good faith action and not prevail. Failure of a cause of action or defense does not 
automatically require the losing party to pay costs." Id. 
The trial court has given undue emphasis to the fact Olympus ultimately 
prevailed in the trial court with respect to the merits of Mr. Matthews' claim, which 
claim had merit and was pursued in good faith. 
2. Mr. Matthews' claim had merit. 
Although the trial court ultimately rejected Mr. Matthews' claim, such claim 
had merit for the following reasons: 
(A) There was no controlling Utah case law specifically interpreting 
the Utah licensing statutes at issue; 
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(B) ' I he [ Jtah statutes at issue were reasonably susceptible to the 
interpretation advanced by Mr. Matthews, particularly in light of the intent and 
purposes of such statutes; 
J ensing statutes similar 
to the Utah statute at issue supported Mr. Matthews' claim; 
(D) Mr. Matthews' claim was ultimately denied, at least in part, 
based upon the ti ial com It's interpretation and application of the Utah licensing 
statutes at issue, not because the trial court rejected any of the facts that Mr. 
Matthews advanced in support of his claim (such as the validity of the assignments 
] inderlying I"\ li I\ latthew s' claim); and 
(E) Admission is a well-established exception to the Utah statute of 
frauds, and the sworn statement of such admission submitted by Mr. Matthews was 
n, 
The trial court erred in finding that Mr. Matthews' claim lacked merit, a 
determination that is a question of law and reviewed by this Court for correctness 
withoi it granting any deference to •• * •" l-vi^'
 t . •-•< '" 1 
P.2d 202, 203 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Accordingly, this Court should reverse the 
trial court's attorney fee award and find that as a matter of law Mr. Matthews' claim 
had merit. 
3, Mr, Matthews5 claim was pursued in good faith. 
Even if this Court determines that Mr. Matthews' claim had no merit, there 
was still no evidence before the trial c : m n t to si lppc it a finding that A li ]\ latthews 
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lacked an honest belief in the propriety of his claim. To the contrary, all of the 
pleadings and documents filed herein evidence Mr. Matthews' sincere belief that 
such claim was justified, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court ultimately 
disagreed with Mr. Matthews' interpretation and application of the Utah statutes. 
There was no evidence before the trial court to support a finding that Mr. 
Matthews intended to take unconscionable advantage of others. There was no 
evidence before the trial court to support a finding that Mr. Matthews intended to 
hinder, delay or defraud Olympus in winding up its business and affairs pursuant to 
the judicial dissolution proceeding. To the contrary, Mr. Matthews has consistently 
expressed concern to the trial court that the judicial dissolution was not proceeding 
in a timely manner. The pleadings, documents and arguments in the trial court 
uniformly establish that Mr. Matthews has consistently attempted to obtain a final 
resolution of his claim against Olympus in a quick and timely manner. 
It is somewhat ironic that as previously set forth in pleadings filed in this 
matter on behalf of Mr. Matthews that it is actually Olympus who has inexcusably 
delayed over a number of years in that: 
(1) no attempt was made to address known third-party claims until 
December 2,2003 (R. 791-835), almost two years after the judicial dissolution was 
commenced on February 1, 2002 (R. 1-6); 
(2) contrary to the express provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-
1308 (2001) (requiring payment to third-party creditors prior to any payments to 
members in a dissolution proceeding), Olympus attempted to repay member loans 
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prior to even addressing timely filed third-party claims, and only as a result of Mr. 
with the plain language of the statute and delay payments to members until after 
payments to third-party creditors (R. 988-1002); and 
(3) Olympi is failed to take any action within the statutory 90-day 
rejection period after claims were filed, and then months after the rejection period 
had expired, and only after the issue was raised in Mr. Matthews5 opposition to 
Olympi is" i notion to repay member loans, Olympus asked the trial court:4 •.-•::,: i n 
an additional period of time to consider and reject timely filed claims (R. 1021-
1038). 
The ti ial :o i i rt placed undue emphasis on the fact that Mr. Matthews did not 
expressly identify in his Notice of Claim, Claim Response or Amended Claim 
Response that he was an assignee of Mr. Law with respect to his claim. Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law Concerning Receiver's Motion for Attorney Fees 
Relating to Claim of David C. Matthews, entered June 12, 2006, ffif 5 & 10, at p 3 
(R 3124) Ilowever, there is no legal basis for applying formal rules of pleading to 
the submission of a claim in a dissolution proceeding, and no legal authority has 
ever been cited for the need for Mr. Matthews to identify his status as an assignee in 
the initial claim documents. It has become abundantly clear through ,;:. \ JI :c,^ 
pleadings and arguments before the trial court that Mr. Matthews is indeed an 
assignee of Mr. Law, and his failure to set forth such status as an assignee in the 
initial claim, documents is simpl) ir not a sufficient legal basis for characterizing his 
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claim as being in bad faith and thereby justifying an award of attorney fees. See 
Affidavit of Fred B. Law, dated October 19,2005. (R. 2946-2948). 
Similarly, the trial court placed undue emphasis on the fact that Mr. 
Matthews and his wife Jane initially misspoke in their affidavits submitted to the 
trial court to the effect that Jane Matthews was the principal broker at the time the 
subject commission was earned. Affidavit of David C. Matthews, dated August 9, 
2005, ffi[ 4, 11 & 12, at pp. 1-2 (R. 2858, 2884-2885); Affidavit of Jane Astle 
Matthews, dated August 8,2005, Iflf 3-5, at p. 1 (R. 2859, 2887). In reality, the 
subject commission had been earned when Fred B. Law was still the principal 
broker of Re-Max Brokers, L.C., and subsequently the Matthews purchased the 
brokerage and Jane Matthews did indeed become the principal broker. Currently 
the Matthews are retired from the Utah real estate business and reside in Virginia, 
and in executing their initial affidavits they were confused as to the date of the 
commission at issue in relation to their subsequent purchase of the brokerage, all of 
which has been explained in subsequent affidavits filed by the Matthews. Affidavit 
of David C. Matthews, dated May 12, 2006, ffif 2-6, at pp. 1-2; Affidavit of Jane 
Astle Matthews, dated October 17, 2005, ffif 2-7, at pp. 1-2. (R. 2942-2943, 3111-
3112). 
The bottom line is that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
simply mislabel Mr. Matthews' actions in pursuing his claim as having been done in 
bad faith because there is no evidence in the record to support such a conclusion. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's attorney fee award. 
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An award of attorney fees is not warranted under I! Ill 111; 5<>(jt), 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The standard for an award of attorney fees under Rule 56(g) is essentially the 
same as the second requirement for an award of attorney fees under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-27-56 (1988)—bad faith. As explained above, Mr. Matthews cii I t 11 
pursue his claim in bad faith. 
Consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's explanation in Valcarce v. 
Fiztgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998), an intent to delay m.v be the basis for a 
finding of bad faith. However, the reality is that there was no real delay in this 
matter as a resu: the subject affidavits—the timing of the relevant memoranda, 
the resulting hearing, and the ultimate determination of this matter were not affected 
by the subject affidavits. In particular, it is noteworthy that no subsequent 
pleadings w ere file d s itl ithe ti ial : oi n 1: after the corrective affidavit was filed, and 
the arguments made by the respective parties at the hearing on the merits of Mr. 
Matthews' claim were the same as they would have been if the corrective affidavit 
had been filed initiall) instead of tl ite affida\ its ^ v ith inadvertent misstatements in ' 
them. 
Pursuant to Rule 56(g), at best, Olympus would only be entitled to recover 
the additioi ial attoi ney fees incurred < >\ <i. • •> uu:.scu • .-. 
affidavits, not the attorney fees incurred to address the overall merits of Mr. 
Matthews' claim, and Olympus has failed to establish that any such additional 
at toi ney fees were ever incurred, • -lrt's awar d does not identify a 
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specific amount of attorney fees awarded pursuant to Rule 56(g) resulting from any 
purported delay. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's attorney 
fee award based on Rule 56(g). 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING OLYMPUS 
ATTORNEY FEES THAT INCLUDED PRO SE ATTORNEY FEES, 
ATTORNEY FEES RELATED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEEDING, AND EXCESS ATTORNEY FEES. 
A, The receiver is a pro se party not entitled to recover attorney fees. 
The attorney fees awarded to Olympus by the trial court include 17.3 hours 
of time spent by Annette Jarvis in her capacity as the receiver for Olympus, totaling 
$4,930.50 (17.3 hours times $285/hour). For the reasons set forth below, this 
amount is not recoverable as "attorney fees." 
In the Stipulated Order Approving Successor Receiver, the role of Ms. Jarvis 
in these proceedings was plainly set forth as follows. 
As Receiver, Ms. Jarvis shall wind up the business and affairs of 
Olympus as provided in Part 13 of the Utah Limited Liability 
Company Act, and shall exercise all of the powers of a receiver of a 
limited liability company provided for by law or equity, except as her 
powers may be specifically circumscribed or expanded by the terms 
of this Order or any subsequent order of the Court. In addition, the 
Receiver may pay on behalf of Olympus all invoices incurred in the 
course of administration of this receivership including, without 
limitation, the Receiver's professional fees and expenses. The 
Receiver may retain legal counsel and other experts or professionals 
of her choosing as are reasonable and necessary to advise her 
concerning legal, technical, or other issues that might arise during the 
administration of this receivership." 
Stipulated Order Approving Successor Receiver, Dated May 6, 2003, f 2, at p. 2 
(emphasis added). (R. 772). 
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The bottom line is that Ms. Jarvis' role in this matter is that of a receiver 
actin11 on Ivli.i1) nf ,im1 st uvlip;; ,!l I'1"1 ,,ilc^ i^ nf^ »»ij»i unl is an i'f< »iney I'M 
Olympus. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1212(2) (2001) authorizes a court to appoint 
"any person" as a receiver, and it is not necessary that the receiver be an attorney 
because in acting as a receiver the perse = > si:v.| ! - : \ ^ lin,; h^::v •. - '- ;• • 
Notably, Alan Funk, the receiver for Olympus preceding the appointment of Ms. 
Jarvis, was not an attorney. However, standing in the shoes of Olympus, Ms. Jarvis 
(in her capacity as receiver) has retained legal niun- el f Sh»\ ni 1 \V tinman :md 
Steven C. Strong of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker) to actually provide legal services on 
behalf of Olympus, in the same manner as Mr. Funk previously retained David Bird 
and his firm of McKay, Burton & Thurman to provide legal services on behalf of 
Olympus. 
It is also noteworthy that consistently in all pleadings filed herein, and in all 
in-person appearances in the trial court, Ms. Jarvis has been identified as the 
receiver (not the attorney) for Olympus, and Steven T. Waterman and Steven C. 
Strong ha\ e been identified as the attorneys for Ms. Jarvis in her capacity as 
Receiver for Olympus. Ms. Jarvis has not signed any pleadings in her capacity as 
an attorney for Olympus, and Ms. Jarvis has not participated in any oral arguments 
In the ti ial com I: as an at tomey for Olympi is, bi it rather Mr. Waterman and Mr. 
Strong have consistently acted as legal counsel for Olympus and Ms. Jarvis in her 
capacity as the receiver for Olympus. 
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This is consistent with the trial court's explanation of the role of Ms. Jarvis 
as receiver set forth above, and with UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1212(3)(ii) (2001) 
which authorizes a receiver to "sue and defend in its own name as receiver of the 
company in all courts of this state," as well as UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1212(5) 
(2001) which authorizes a receiver to pay the expense of the "receiver's counsel 
from the assets of the company or proceeds from the sale of the assets." 
In defining the nature of an attorney fee that is recoverable pursuant to 
contract or statute (as is the case herein), the Utah Supreme Court has explained that 
an "attorney fee" is "'a monetary obligation (a fee) paid or owed from one person 
(a client) to another person who has provided legal representation (an attorney).'" 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1375 (Utah 
1996) (quoting with approval Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, 114 P.2d 909, 
910 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989)). The Utah Supreme Court further explained: "We agree 
that under such an interpretation, an attorney's fee presupposes a relationship of 
attorney and client which does not exist in pro se situations." Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Quite simply, Ms. Jarvis, in her capacity as receiver for Olympus, 
is the client in these proceedings, and Mr. Waterman and Mr. Strong are the 
attorneys. Ms. Jarvis is compensated by Olympus for providing services in her 
capacity as the receiver for Olympus, not as an attorney for Olympus, and her fees 
are no more recoverable than Mr. Funk's professional non-legal fees would have 
been had he remained as the receiver. To the extent that Mr. Jarvis is an attorney 
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for purposes of these proceedings, then she stands m ihc shoes 01 in. id\v linn .n the 
Jones, Waldo c*\ - • * "*.•». \ ^* . , , . - , . . 
The fact that Olympus is not able to recover the fees paid to Ms. Jarvis in her 
capacity as its receiver "is consistent with the public policy that the basic purpose of 
attorney fees is to indemnify the prevailing part v and m il I i > punish the 1- - * : 
by allowing the winner a windfall profit." Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young 
I . i• . : , see Jones, Waldo, _.-• r.-uai ;.-
(indicating attorney fee awards are means to "'vindicate persona] :>;i\n^fc" (her 
than means to "'generate fees'" (quoting Falcone v. Internal Rev.. Serv.9 714 F.2d 
646,6 4 8(i > • l€ i 1 983)). . ; ' ^ ' • "• ' . 
The reason Olympus has to pay Ms. Jarvis to act as receiver is becai lse the 
principals of Olympus could not get along and they were required to retain the 
^ * . J .-. ; .;•. winding up the business and affairs of 
Olympus. See Petition for Judicial Dissolution of Olympus Construction, L.C., 
filed February 1, 2002, f 9, at p. 3. (R. 3), If the principals of Olympus had been 
able In yd iii'lliiiiij1 mil ih IIIIMIII ss Ingelliu, mi jl It ,isl euoperate for purposes of 
dissolution, there would have been no need to retain the services of Ms. Jarvis as 
receiver, and the manager or other principal acting on behalf of Olympus would 
communicating with legal counsel, and Olympus would not have been entitled to 
recover any compensation paid to its manager as an "attorney fee" in this 
n u n u T i l i i i i 1 , \ II I  i i ^ i i i ( ( 11 \ i i mi 11 mi ( I n in i i i \ i ' i LU I " d l l n i M c y In i ' ' l i i i i III i i , | i , i, , o t K I s , 
Jarvis in this proceeding in her capacity as receiver simply because she happens to 
be an attorney would be a windfall to Olympus that is not intended in an award of 
attorney fees. 
B. The administrative complaint was not necessary or relevant. 
The Statement of Services attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Steven C. 
Strong (R. 3048-3062) includes 4.7 hours spent pursuing a formal administrative 
complaint with the Utah Real Estate Commission for a total cost of $1,157.50 
($541.50 of which is attributable to Ms. Jarvis).2 
This administrative complaint was not necessary in defending against Mr. 
Matthews' claim. Indeed, no action was actually taken against Mr. Matthews by the 
Real Estate Commission, and once again this merely highlights the vindictive nature 
of Olympus' conduct towards Mr. Matthews in pursuing extra-judicial actions in an 
attempt to punish Mr. Matthews for being the sole creditor to insist that Olympus 
comply with controlling statutes, such as the prohibition on disbursements to 
owners prior to disbursements being made to third-party creditors. 
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764, P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1998), the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the factors to be considered in determining what constitutes 
a reasonable award of attorney fees, including "[h]ow much of the work performed 
2
 06/24/05, 0.8 of Attorney Strong's total 3.2 hours attributed to this task, $176.00; 
07/05/05, 0.8 hours by Attorney Strong, $176.00; 07/05/05, 1.9 hours by Ms. Jarvis, 
$541.50; 07/08/05, 0.6 hours by Attorney Strong, $132.00; 10/12/05, 0.1 of 
Attorney Strong's total 0.2 hours attributed to this task, $22.00; 10/18/06 0.5 of 
Attorney Strong's total 1.3 hours attributed tot his task, $110.00. 
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was reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter[.]" The response to 
this inquiry is tint illllic adniiiiislnilivf* nnii|tlaiii1 I11(,il n il!i (In: Real Fstate 
Commission was not reasonably necessary to defend against Mr. Matthews' claim. 
Indeed, the administrative action was irrelevant. Accordingly, no attorney fees 
should be awarded wi'1 ^^'-rt r n ..' •».-. \ it. 
C. Excessive time was spent addressing Mr. Matthews' claim. 
The inquiry from Dixie State Bank discussed above with respect to the 
administrative complaint filed ;r ; n,* Mi \!:r4!nu\< .? \ * \< ,
 : ^ 
overall time spent by the attorneys for Olympus in addressing Mr. Matthews' claim. 
1 Itl the time spent was reasonably necessary to adequately defend against this 
claim. Dixie State Bank also explains that another \ i |ii ", to hv iiindc hy \ • «• " " 
determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee award is whether "there [are] 
ciicumstances which require consideration of additional factors. The attorneys 
for Olympus have spent an inordinate amount of time in d* .din -
they have led the trial court to believe is so lacking in substance that it constitutes a 
iiici illrss t'liiiiiii iLojchj warranting an award of attorney fees. Given the alleged 
lack of merit in the claim, it should'have been relatively easy for Olympus' 
attorneys to dispose of the claim quickly and economically. 
'• ' " ' . J •: ^; . s :w ...... r - ^ .;. ;; appears that an 
excessive amount of time was spent in numerous attorney conference vc\ 
multiple individuals, and research, which is inconsistent with Olympus' position 
that J li : I latthe i s :lair i as entirely without merit. For example, from 10/28/05 
-•
 :
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through 10/31/05, a total of 6.1 hours, and $1,514.00, was spent in addressing a 
very simple proposed revision to the Receiver's Order Granting Receiver's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Disallowing Claim of David C. Matthews. Mr. 
Matthews' attorneys had merely proposed that an additional clause be inserted 
indicating that the Order constituted a final judgment with respect to Mr. Matthews' 
claim. 6.1 hours and $1,514.00 to address such a simple request is patently 
unreasonable. At most, thirty minutes of Attorney Strong's time should have been 
adequate to address this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's denial of Mr. Matthews' claim and judgment in favor of Olympus, and 
remand with directions to the trial court to enter an order requiring Olympus to 
summarily pay the full amount of Mr. Matthews' timely filed claim as an approved 
claim due to the failure of Olympus to timely reject the claim in writing as 
mandated by statute. If this Court grants that relief, all of the other aspects of the 
trial court's judgment that Mr. Matthews' challenged must also be reversed. 
Alternatively, this Court should: 
(1) reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Olympus as to Mr. Matthews' claim, and remand this case to the trial court for a 
trial on the merits of Mr. Matthews' claim, including a resolution of the disputed 
issues of fact surrounding the statute of frauds defense asserted on behalf of 
Olympus; 
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( J11 reverse i: , • *. 
grounds that Mr. Matthews' claim has merit and/or was asserted in good faith; 
and/or 
( \\ icveist! Ilit1 In II! * n i i i r . i i l i 'k ' i in in ilinn I lln1 .ininiiiiiit nl i i l turnry 
fees awarded to Olympus and remand to the trial court for a calculation of 
Olympus' reasonable attorney fees, if any, strictly limited to the purported delay 
C . •* . . i _ - . . : : - : i i < , - . ; * • » . • i J \ . ' ^ **•• " ^ 
Annette Jarvis, any fees attributable to the administrative complaint pursued by 
Olympus, and any fees attributable to excess and unnecessary time spent on this 
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Because this case presents the first opportunity for a Utah appellate court to 
d^ •* - in I in in r I 11 ill TuiM: ANN '* IS *» P i n ( > 1 | | I I I in ' ppi ll.ii in 1  in j i i t 'sh 
that oral argument be held in this matter. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Minute Entry, March 2:>, 2005; unsigned Order Denying Mr. Matthews' 
Motion to Pay Claim; unsigned Order Denying Mr. Matthews' Motion to 
Pay Claim (R 2140-2146) 
I N AND r f . . : . . . .-.r^ C u u N T Y , S T A T E O F J1AH 
I N R E : . • . • : • PI I IN J'l'E ElT'l'K11!' 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION, L.C., : CASE NO. 020904299 
David C. Matthews' Proposed Order Denying Motion,, to Pay Claim 
is filed unsigned for r:;^  reasons " t forth in the Receiver's 
C\:-j*- .
 1 - • .-:^ cj.-e 'r^.trwise w.i th approval of the 
Court, che Matthews claim will be resolved in accordance with the 
Claim Resolution Procedures ITDT: roved :.*• ~b Court. 
1::.. . . .. .•_!-..:/ :. .i_i : :::cn .;.:ute tl le Order of the 
Court resclvi:/.' -:he matters referenced herein. 
Dated this o~v of March, 2005. 
.SMI/co 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
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Darryl J. Lee 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Annette W. Jarvis 
Steven T. Waterman 
Steven C. Strong 
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36 S. State Street, Suite 1400 
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Dwayne A. Vance 
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P . O . Box 682800 
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FILED DISTRICT COJIRT 
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KE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIST VII 'I I < il 'V I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. S 1 ATE OF UTAH 
x^m 
NYINC MR. 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION, !..(. 
, ORDER DE I G . MA 1 i iii \VS' 
I MOTION TO PAY CLAIM 
i 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Ci\ il No. 020904299 
a a . ••• 
A \loiiov ,o Kay ( uin:i -AJS f:h.d -.M* !*• l-aliV.f p j \ id C. Matthews r Vr. Matthews"), a 
purporn >i err.1'!: „- ^Ct -K v; '.'.s Construction, i_ el i v /as opp osed I: } lL.li i 
Recei ve, , earing was held on February 28, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. regarding this matter, with 
counsel appearing on belmlfof: f?..*. ;% ' •%, .. . :i . . . . _„ . 
memoranda filed in support of and in opposition ^ ^e \h-!ion. a: i the arguments of counsel at 
the Hearinir, and IMM» Uai',c appo.'iin".1|"'1 I • 
IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The disposal of claims against Olympus was previously addressed in this Court's 
Successor Receiver Order entered on May 6, 2003 (''Successor Receiver Order"), f 4, which 
states, "the Receiver may dispose of known and unknown claims against Olympus by notice 
and/or publication, may set dates for the barring of such claims and may accept or reject claims 
all as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1305 and 1306." The procedures referenced in the 
Successor Receiver Order were not mandatory, but rather were phrased in terms of discretionary 
procedures that the Receiver "may" pursue if desired. 
2. Pursuant to the Receiver's authority as set forth in the Successor Receiver Order, on 
December 2, 2003 the Receiver filed a Motion for Declaratory Relief and Establishing a Claim 
Bar Date and a Claim Filing Procedure, whereby the Receiver sought approval for June 30, 2004 
as a claim bar date by which date known claimants against Olympus were required to file a 
written Notice of Claim or their claim would be forever barred, and whereby the Receiver further 
sought approval for the notice of the requested claim bar date to be provided by the Receiver and 
approval for the form of the written Notice of Claim to be submitted by the claimants. The 
Receiver's motion for establishing the claim bar date was expressly based on Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 48-2c-1305 and -1306, as referenced in paragraph 4 of the Successor Receiver Order. 
3. Because no objections to the Receiver's foregoing motion had been filed, on February 
26, 2004 the Court entered an Order Granting Receiver's Motion for Declaratory Relief and 
Establishing a Claim Bar Date and a Claim Filing Procedure, which established June 30,2004 as 
the claim bar date, and further approved the requested form of notice to known claimants and the 
written Notice of Claim to be filed by the claimants. 
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4. Mr. Mat thews timely filed a'Notice of Claim on June M\ ?()() 1 < Liiii m" lli il < il, i |> s 
owed him the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). i hs Notice of Claim 
merely r?nreseri* ; ' \ : : | -... '*'!. *•** *-• " . • . ' . 
the Receiver pursuant to the claim resolution procedures established by this Court. 
5 I ii 1 4attl lew s 1 las file- :! a m :)ti : i 11 : pa? his claii i i, at gi lii lg tl lat 1 lis claii :t I si IC i lid b 2 
considered approved for payment under Section 48-2c- l305(4) , ]• vh provides: "Claims which 
,1111* mi 1 nl tnju, (i MI 111\ lli ' div.i »1\ rd C( . '.••( • .v.i: 
the dissolved company shall be considered approved." it ;. undisputed that the Receiver did not 
reject I" 4i . :•. • u .
 c: I:ML claim.. 
6. ' I he Court concludes that the Receiver i^ i.«-i hi mud K- the 90-day time perio-I :?1 
^ - . . ^ . / i i . s a . a i ! , i f. *i\.nj u.> ultcr a ^iciii:i i»ui date 
has been established, biit rather the disposal of claims against Olympus in this judicial 
proceeding is subject to the equitable powers ;i»i;t --Lii and \Uc role <Vth;s Court .as final 
arbiter of any and all claims against Olympus. 
7. According!) , Mi Matthews' Motion to Pay Claim is hereby denied. 
Dated this day of March, 2005. 
BY T H E COURT: 
UftftoptQA 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, 
Third Judicial District Court Jr. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 10 day of March, 2005,1 mailed, via first class mail, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Order Denying Mr. Matthews' Motion 
to Pay Claim to: 
Annette W. Jarvis 
Steven C. Strong 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
P.O. Box 45385 
36 S. State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Rick Knuth 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Darryl J. Lee 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Order Prepared and Submitted by: 
Annette W. Jarvis (1649) 
Steven T. Waterman (4164) 
Steven C. Strong (6340) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543 
; 0 v i \ • . •.- • : L t ' . o r 
:.\ I'liE THIRD JUDICIAL Di^iKIC'l v uLKY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: KDLR DENYING MK. MATTHEWS' 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION, L.C. 
MOTION TO PAY CLAIM 
Civil No. 020904299 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
THE COURT, having reviewed and considered the Motion to Pay Claim filed by 
claimant DiiViti < ' Pdallhcws flhe "Mnltlirws1 M^lioif K mid the !>' 'al memoranda tilni in 
support of and in opposition to the Motion, and having granted the Receiver's Motion for 
J .* : * . . . - ' c c i . j - i - : K 'y, [ \ { ; : - Y < ji\L):A\>., : c :* 
the reasons set forth on the record in granting the Receiver's Motion, AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Matthews' Motion is denied without prejudice; and 
2. Mr. Matthews may seek allowance of his claim through the Court-approved 
procedures established pursuant to the Court's order granting the Receiver's Motion. 
DATED this day of March, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Tyrone E. Medley 
Third Judicial District Court 
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ADDENDUM R 
Order Granting Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment and Disallowing 
Claim of David C. Matthews (R. 3037-3039). 
Order Prepared by: 
Steven T. Waterman (4164) 
Steven C. Strong (6340) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for the Receiver 
;>.• .\i .):-,; . . i v . . O I K ! 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION, L.C. 
ORDER GRANTING RECEIVER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DISALLOWING CLAIM OF 
DAVID C. MATTHEWS 
Civil No. 020904299 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
( .-..-. ,ober ~4. J<,-, ,„. j
 !C t_\ uri conducted a hearing as scheduled upon good and 
sufficient notice on the Receiver5s Motion for Summary Judgn i •. •!; t n n i <o:! >\ i"1. > ' i d 
C. Matthews (the "Motion"), which was filed on or about July 6, 2005 by Annette W. Jarvis in 
her capacity as the cc i u I: appointed i ec .ei\ er (the "R ecen • er") fc i Olympi is Consti uction, I ,C. in 
this receivership case. 
Steven C. Strong, Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C., appeared as counsel for the Receiver 
(who was also present), and David Thompson and Dwayne A. Vance, Miller Vance & 
Thompson, appeared as counsel for David C. Matthews. 
Based on the memoranda, affidavits, and other papers filed in support of and in 
opposition to the Motion, and based on the arguments of counsel at the hearing, the Court made 
its findings and conclusions on the record at the conclusion of the hearing, which findings and 
conclusions are incorporated herein, and THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Summary judgment in favor of the Receiver and against David C. 
Matthews is granted as requested in the Motion; 
2. The claim of David C. Matthews is barred by the Utah statute of frauds, 
Utah Code § 25-5-4, as well as by applicable Utah statutes governing real estate broker 
commissions, including Utah Code §§61-2-18 and 61-2-10; and 
3. The claim of David C. Matthews is disallowed as a matter of law. 
DATED this day of November, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Tyrone E. Medley 
Third Judicial District Court 
Approved as to form: 
Dwayne A. Vance 
Miller Vance & Thompson 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER was 
served by first-class U.S. Mail, pns1;it_;upiq->iii.l nil llii.i slj?Jl d.iy ofOiiuki .'MU:., loiadiol 
the following: 
Dwayne A. Vance 
2200 North Park Avenue #D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, UT 84068 
James S. Lowrie 
RickL. Knuth 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Darryl J. Lee 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 East South Temple #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
X sxl 
845560,.! 
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ADDENDUM C 
Order and Judgment Granting Attorney Fee Award against David C. 
Matthews; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Concerning 
Receiver's Motion for Attorney Fees Relating to claim of David C. 
Matthews (R. 3155-3286). 
Order and Judgment prepared by: 
Steven T. Waterman (4164) 
Steven C. Strong (6340) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for the Receiver 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN RE: 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION, L.C. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT GRANTING 
ATTORNEY FEE AWARD AGAINST 
DAVID C. MATTHEWS 
Civil No. 020904299 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Pursuant to this Court's FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CONCERNING RECEIVER'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES RELATING TO CLAIM OF 
DA VID C. MATTHEWS, entered June 12, 2006, and this Court's MINUTE ENTRYentered June 
12, 2006, 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SALT LAKE C( 
JUL 2 0 2006 
:  OUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AND DIRECTS THAT JUDGMENT BE ENTERED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. Judgment shall be and hereby is entered in the amount of $25,112.50 against 
David C. Matthews and in favor of Annette W. Jarvis, Receiver of Olympus Construction, L.C, 
which amount is the reasonable attorney fees awarded in connection with the meritless claim 
pursued in bad faith by David C. Matthews in this receivership case; and 
2. Although the receivership case involves multiple claims and multiple parties, the 
Court hereby determines that there is no just reason for delay and thus directs that entry of the 
judgment for attorney fees set forth above, and the related ORDER GRANTING RECEIVER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISALLOWING CLAIM OF DAVID C. 
MATTHEWS entered December 20, 2005, shall together constitute the final judgment, pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), respecting the claim of David C. Matthews and the related award of 
attorney fees. 
DATED this j ^ day of July, 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing [Proposed] JUDGMENT 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT GRANTING ATTORNEY FEE AWARD AGAINST DAVID C. 
MATTHEWS was served by first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this 29th day of June, 
2006, to each of the following: 
Dwayne A. Vance 
2200 North Park Avenue #D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, UT 84068 
James S. Lowrie 
Rick L. Knuth 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Darryl J. Lee 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 East South Temple #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
881509vl 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT GRANTING ATTORNEY FEE AWARD AGAINST DAVID C. MATTHEWS 
was served by first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this ^ c^) day of July, 2006, to each of 
the following: 
Steven C. Strong 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Dwayne A. Vance 
2200 North Park Avenue #D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, UT 84068 
James S. Lowrie 
Rick L. Knuth 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Darryl J. Lee 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 East South Temple #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
>)QJAJL*Y 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In Re: 
OLYMPUS CONSTRUCTION, L.C. 
Civil No. 020904299 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING RECEIVER'S 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES RELATING TO CLAIM OF DAVID C. MATTHEWS 
Annette W. Jarvis, in her capacity as the court-appointed receiver (the "Receiver") of 
Olympus Construction, L.C. ("Olympus"), filed the Receiver's Motion for Attorney Fees 
Relating to Claim of David C. Matthews (the "Motion"). By the Motion, the Receiver seeks an 
order requiring David C. Matthews ("Matthews") to pay some of the Receiver's reasonable 
attorney fees incurred in responding to the Notice of Claim filed by Matthews (the "Matthews 
Claim") in this receivership case. The Motion is based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, which 
permits an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party if the action "was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith/' and on Utah R. Civ. P. 56(g), which permits an award of 
attorney fees if affidavits presented in summary judgment litigation "are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay." The Receiver claims that both Section 78-27-56 and Rule 56(g) 
apply to the Matthews Claim and entitle the Receiver to an award of her reasonable attorney fees 
incurred in opposing the Matthews Claim. The Court enters these findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in accordance with Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 1 
1. Matthews signed the Matthews Claim on June 7, 2004, and filed the claim in this 
receivership case on June 30, 2004. 
2. Pursuant to the Matthews Claim, Matthews asserted that Olympus owes him 
$100,000 for his services as a real estate broker in connection with Olympus's purchase of real 
property in Summit County in 1998. 
3. The face of the "Notice of Claim" form on which Matthews asserted his claim 
indicates that by signing and filing the claim, Matthews was swearing and attesting "to the 
truthfulness and accuracy" of the claim under penalty of perjury. 
4. The "Notice of Claim" form clearly identifies "David C. Matthews" as the 
"Creditor," which the form defines as the "person or other entity to whom Olympus owes 
money or property." 
1
 The relevant facts are of record in the following documents on file with the Court: (1) the 
Amended Claim Response on Behalf of David C. Matthews (including a copy of the Receiver's 
letter of October 6, 2004 attached as an exhibit thereto) (filed May 12, 2005); (2) the 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment to Disallow 
Claim of David C. Matthews (filed July 6,2005); (3) the Affidavit of Annette W. Jarvis 
(including a copy of the Matthews Claim and all supporting documents attached as exhibits 
thereto) (filed July 6,2005); (4) the Affidavit of Carrie A. Hurst (including exhibits) (filed July 
6, 2005); (5) the Memorandum in Opposition to Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(including the affidavits of David Matthews and Jane Matthews attached as exhibits thereto) 
(filed August 12,2005); (6) the Reply in Support of Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment 
to Disallow Claim of David C. Matthews (including Matthews' discovery responses attached as 
an exhibit thereto) (filed August 26, 2005); (7) the second Affidavit of Carrie A. Hurst 
(including exhibit) (filed August 26, 2005); (8) the Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition 
to Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment (including affidavits of Jane Matthews and Fred 
B. Law attached as exhibits thereto) (filed October 20,2005); and (9) the Receiver's Response 
to "Supplemental Memorandum" of David C. Matthews (filed October 21, 2005). 
2 
5. Nothing on the face of the Matthews Claim or in any of the documents Matthews 
submitted to the Receiver as attachments to the claim indicates that the alleged $100,000 real 
estate commission was promised or owed to any person or entity other than Matthews in his 
direct, individual capacity. 
6. After investigating the grounds for the Matthews Claim, the Receiver determined 
that the claim was meritless. 
7. The Receiver sent a letter dated October 6, 2004 to Matthews5 counsel requesting 
that Matthews withdraw his claim and specifically notifying Matthews that if he did not, the 
Receiver intended to "proceed with litigation in the Receivership Court to obtain summary 
disallowance of the Matthews Claim" and would seek "court costs and attorneys fees from Mr. 
Matthews to the extent allowed by law." 
8. The Receiver incurred substantial attorney fees on behalf of Olympus in various 
reasonable efforts to oppose the Matthews Claim, including (but not limited to) attempting to 
convince Matthews to withdraw the claim without litigation, successfully opposing Matthews' 
motion to compel immediate payment of the claim, formally opposing the claim pursuant to the 
court-approved claim resolution procedures in effect in this receivership case, and successfully 
prosecuting a summary judgment motion and obtaining a ruling disallowing the claim as a 
matter of law. 
9. On May 12,2005, Matthews filed his Amended Claim Response (the "Claim 
Response") addressing the Receiver's formal objection to the Matthews Claim. 
10. Nothing in the Claim Response indicated that Matthews was claiming he was an 
assignee of a claim held by a real estate broker named Fred B. Law. 
3 
11. Matthews contended that the documents submitted to the Receiver in connection 
with the Matthews Claim "clearly establish the existence of a broker relationship between Mr. 
Matthews and Olympus." Claim Response at 2-3. 
12. Matthews asserted that Olympus "agreed to pay Mr. Matthews a $100,000 
commission" (Claim Response at 3), that the claimed $100,000 commission "represents 
compensation for services provided by Mr. Matthews" (Claim Response at 3), that Matthews 
"performed valuable services in conjunction with the acquisition of the subject real property in 
reliance upon the agreement to pay Mr. Matthews $100,000 in exchange for such services" 
(Claim Response at 7), that "the agreement to pay Mr. Matthews $100,000 was made . . . as an 
inducement for Mr. Matthews to provide services" (Claim Response at 8), and that "Mr. 
Matthews did not have a cognizable action against Olympus until Olympus breached its 
promise to pay Mr. Matthews the $100,000" (Claim Response at 9). 
13. Matthews attempted to avoid the preclusive effect of the Utah statute of frauds by 
arguing, contrary to governing case law and without any supporting citations to the contrary, that 
the commission amount was not an essential contract term and need not be in writing. 
14. Matthews argued that the statute of frauds did not apply because of a limited 
exception under Utah case law that only applies when a defendant has admitted, either in 
pleadings or under oath, that an oral contract exists. 
15. Matthews knew that neither Olympus nor the Receiver ever admitted the 
existence of the alleged oral contract in any pleading or in any sworn statement. 
4 
16. Matthews had more than six years after the alleged oral promise was made in late 
1998 to obtain a sworn statement from an authorized representative of Olympus as evidence of 
the alleged promise, but he failed to do so. 
17. Matthews admitted that his attempt to obtain a signed writing from Richard Jaffa 
to evidence the alleged oral promise was unsuccessful. 
18. After the Receiver raised the effect of the Utah broker commission statutes, 
Matthews attempted to avoid the preclusive effect of the statutes by arguing, contrary to his 
original position, that he was an assignee of a claim belonging to a principal broker and that he 
could pursue the assignor's claim in his own name. 
19. In Request No. 14 of the Receiver's Requests for Admission pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 36, Matthews admitted the following: "Admit that your filing of the Matthews Claim 
and related papers in the receivership court is an attempt by you to obtain payment of the real 
estate commission from someone other than a principal broker." 
20. In Request No. 16, Matthews admitted the following: "Admit that Re-Max 
Brokers, L.C. was the principal brokerage with which you were affiliated during the period 
August 1998 through December 1998." 
21. In Interrogatory No. 4 of the Receiver's Interrogatories propounded to Matthews 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 33, Matthews identified all principal brokers with whom he was 
affiliated, and Matthews stated, in relevant part: "Jane Matthews principal broker in 1998," but 
Matthews made no mention of Fred B. Law. 
5 
22. In Interrogatory No. 6, Matthews identified "all persons who may have 
information concerning the Matthews Claim," including the names of twelve specific 
individuals, but did not list Fred B. Law. 
23. In response to the Receiver's Requests for Production of Documents made to 
Matthews pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 34, the only document Matthews produced was a copy of 
a one-page "Certificate of Licensure" issued by the Utah Division of Real Estate concerning the 
real estate license of David C. Matthews, which Certificate clearly indicates that Matthews was 
licensed as an Associate Broker of "Re-Max Brokers" from February 1998 to March 1999, and 
did not become affiliated with "Re-Max Town & Country" until February 2001. 
24. The Certificate is consistent with Matthews' response to Request for Admission 
No. 16 noted above, but is inconsistent with the false statements in his affidavit discussed 
below. 
25. In his response to Request for Admission No. 6, Matthews admitted that at all 
relevant times he was "bound by the Utah statutes and administrative rules applicable to 
licensed real estate associate brokers." 
26. In response to Request No. 10, Matthews admitted that he "personally asked 
Richard Jaffa to provide [to Matthews] a signed document indicating that Olympus had agreed 
to pay [Matthews] a $100,000 real estate commission in connection with Olympus's purchase of 
the Property in December 1998, but he [Jaffa] refused to do so." 
27. In the Receiver's initial memorandum filed July 6,2005 in support of her 
summary judgment motion, the Receiver argued that the Matthews Claim was barred as a 
matter of law by the Utah statute of frauds and also by Utah real estate commission statutes. 
6 
28. In Matthew's Notice of Claim, which he signed under penalty of perjury on June 
7, 2004, in Matthew's Claim Response filed May 12,2005, and in Matthew's sworn and binding 
answers to the Receiver's written discovery requests, Matthews stated unequivocally that the 
alleged oral promise to pay a $100,000 commission was made by Olympus directly to him and 
gave rise to a payment obligation Olympus owed directly to him. 
29. On August 12, 2005, when Matthews filed his memorandum in opposition to 
summary judgment and related affidavits (after the Receiver pointed out that under Utah law 
only a principal broker could pursue a commission claim against Olympus), Matthews stated 
under oath that the alleged oral promise actually was made not to him but to "Re/Max Town and 
Country," and that his wife, as the principal broker of "Re/Max Town and Country," had 
assigned the claim to him. 
30. On October 20, 2005, when Matthews filed his "Supplemental Memorandum" 
and related affidavits (after the Receiver pointed out the false statements in the two prior 
affidavits), Matthews changed his story again by asserting that it was not actually his wife who 
was the principal broker entitled to assert the claim against Olympus, but Fred B. Law, who had 
orally assigned the claim to Matthews' wife, who later orally assigned the claim to Matthews. 
31. On August 12, 2005, Matthews filed his Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Receiver's motion for summary judgment, and in support thereof, he also filed the Affidavit of 
David C. Matthews (the "David Matthews Affidavit") and the Affidavit of Jane Astle Matthews 
(the "Jane Matthews Affidavit"). 
32. The David Matthews Affidavit contains false statements that directly contradict 
Matthews' prior representations and statements made under penalty of perjury including in 
7 
paragraph 4 of the affidavit wherein Matthews states that in 1998, he and his wife owed a real 
estate brokerage company in Park City named "Re/Max Town and Country," and that his wife 
was the principal broker. 
33. The Certificate of Licensure in Matthews' own possession that he produced in 
response to the Receiver's document request clearly shows that Matthews did not become 
affiliated with Re-Max Town & Country until February 2001, more than two years after the 
December 1998 transaction. 
34. The statement in paragraph 4 of the Matthews Affidavit directly contradicts 
Matthews' answer to Request for Admission No. 16. 
35. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the David Matthews Affidavit, Matthews states, that the 
alleged promise by Olympus to pay a $100,000 commission was made directly "to Re/Max" 
rather than to Matthews personally. 
36. Paragraph 12 of the David Matthews Affidavit states that Matthews' pursuit of the 
$100,000 commission "has been in my capacity as the assignee from my wife of the 
Commission," which statement directly contradicts the statements Matthews made under 
penalty of perjury on the face of the Matthews Claim and his other statements and 
representations alleging that the $100,000 commission was promised to him personally and 
earned by him personally, and that he was pursuing the claim in his own right and in his own 
name as the "Creditor" to whom Olympus owed the money. 
37. The Jane Matthews Affidavit contains similar false statements concerning Jane 
Matthews' alleged status as the principal broker of Re/Max Town and Country in 1998. 
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38. The false statements in the David Matthews Affidavit and the Jane Matthews 
Affidavit caused the Receiver to incur additional legal fees, including but not limited to those 
incurred in investigating the new allegations, obtaining a Certificate of Licensure concerning 
Jane Matthews, and pointing out those false statements to this Court in the Receiver's reply 
memorandum in support of summary judgment. 
39. Nearly two months after the Receiver's reply memorandum was served, and only 
three business days before the summary judgment hearing, Matthews served a second 
"Affidavit of Jane Astle Matthews" admitting that her prior affidavit contained false statements, 
admitting that "Re-Max Brokers, L.C." (not Re/Max Town and Country) was the brokerage 
with which she and Matthews were associated in 1998, and admitting that she was not a 
principal broker at the relevant time. 
40. Although the new affidavit of Jane Matthews contradicted and purportedly 
corrected some of her prior sworn statements regarding these facts, no new affidavit for David 
Matthews was submitted to withdraw or amend his own false affidavit on these same points. 
41. The only affidavit of David Matthews on file with this Court contains materially 
false statements that Matthews' knows are false. 
42. In addition to purporting to correct prior false statements in her affidavit, the new 
affidavit of Jane Matthews stated that an individual named Fred B. Law was the principal 
broker with which both she and Matthews were affiliated in 1998, and that Mr. Law had 
assigned the $100,000 commission claim to Jane Matthews, who in turn assigned the claim to 
Matthews. 
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43. Matthews filed the new affidavit of Jane Matthews on October 20, 2005 along 
with his "Supplemental Memorandum." 
44. In the "Supplemental Memorandum," Matthews adopted his new "Fred Law 
assignment" theory as the basis for his claim, and he also included an affidavit of Fred B. Law. 
45. In late October 2005, less than 3 business days before the summary judgment 
hearing and more than 16 months after Matthews signed the Matthews Claim under penalty of 
perjury, Matthews asserted for the first time that the $100,000 claim he was pursuing against 
Olympus was actually a claim of Remax Brokers, L.C., with Fred B. Law as principal broker 
that Matthews held only by way of an indirect, double oral assignment. 
46. The Receiver incurred additional fees responding to the untimely and 
unauthorized Supplemental Memorandum and related supplemental affidavits. 
47. At the conclusion of the summary judgment hearing held October 24,2005, this 
Court disallowed the Matthews Claim and ruled that the claim was barred as a matter of law by 
the Utah statute of frauds and applicable provisions of Utah real estate commission statutes. 
48. The actions taken by Matthews in support of the Matthews Claim were solely for 
the purpose of causing delay and needlessly increasing the cost of this litigation. 
49. Matthews' improper actions in pursuing the Matthews' Claim were motivated by 
his financial desire of $100,000, as sought by the Matthews' Claim. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Matthews Claim was without merit and not asserted or brought in good faith. 
2. Section 78-27-56 provides: 
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(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party 
under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the 
court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions 
of Subsection (1). 
Utah Code § 78-27-56. 
3. "Where a party has acted on a meritless claim and in bad faith, in most cases it 
would be inequitable not to award attorney fees." Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. 
Cannon, 2002 UT 99, ^  31. 
4. A claim is "without merit" if it is "frivolous" or "of little weight or importance 
having no basis in law or fact." Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, \ 22. 
5. The Matthews Claim was frivolous, and certainly was of "little weight" with "no 
basis in law or fact." 
6. Governing Utah case law, as set forth in the Receiver's summary judgment 
memoranda, including Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 876 (Utah 1953), strictly interprets the 
relevant statutory language and specifically prohibits any real estate agent or associate broker 
including Matthews, from pursuing a commission claim against anyone other than the principal 
broker, even if the agent or associate broker claims to hold an assignment from the principal 
broker. 
7. Matthews cited no Utah case law to the contrary and incorrectly asserted that 
there was no applicable Utah case law, and failed to cite controlling Utah precedent. There is no 
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Utah case law that excuses Matthews' failure to comply with the governing statutory 
commission provisions. 
8. Matthews' arguments had no basis in fact or law, and therefore were "without 
merit" for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
9. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that claims with similarly weak or non-
existent legal support are "without merit" supporting an award of legal fees under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56. See Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, Tf 30; 
Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, \ 22; Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 
(Utah 1998) (holding that "a finding that a party has attempted to avoid liability by testifying 
falsely will support a decision to award attorney fees if combined with a finding of bad faith"). 
10. The Utah Supreme Court has established that a party acts in "bad faith" for 
purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, under the standard of: 
the trial court must find that one or more of the following factors 
existed: (i) The party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; (ii) the party intended to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; or (iii) the party intended to or acted with the 
knowledge that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or 
defraud others. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998). 
11. Matthews' lack of an honest belief in the legal basis for his claim, and his 
knowledge that his pursuit of the claim would unjustly hinder and delay the Receiver in her 
attempts to administer and close the Olympus receivership estate, is evidenced by his 
contradictory representations and admissions. 
12. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(g) provides: 
12 
If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely 
for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay 
to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits 
caused, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
13 Whether false statements were made in Matthews' sworn statements and 
• \<],A::- •' is that the alleged $100,000 commission was promised to him and owed to him in his 
own right for his own efforts, or in Matthews' later sworn statements that the alleged $100,000 
commission was promised and owed to Re-Max Town & Country with his wife as principal 
broker, or in Matthews' last representations in the last-minute "Supplemental \Tav.r-; r r * ' 
the alleged $100,000 commission was promised and owed to Fred B. Law and then indirectly 
assigned to him, it is clear that Matthews made materially false and patentlj inconsistent 
statements in this proceeding, and that Matthews knew (or is charged with knowing) that those 
statem^n; v •.••- f hi ' * ! - • .* *'u i. 
Vlatthews' assertions are not caused by a faulty memory because they are key, 
essential, i"i'l inalcnal U«. N mi IUJIL'JJ, thai MaU'n n«- was never a I'ieensetl piinnpal huka 
1 5 Matthews' own discovery responses, along with the second affidavit of his wife, 
Line Matlliens, tuiR;liLsi\ el)/ esiiibli.sli thai Malilims knew h is own affidavit OA n>c wnii'aiis 
Court contained false statements, yet neither Matthews nor his counsel withdrew or amended it. 
..-. .n*_\v.s ruicw iur i3 charged with knowing) that his claim was barred by the 
statute of frauds and the Utah broker commission statutes. 
Matthews admitted that he was a licensed associate broker at all relevant times 
and was bound to follow the governing statutes and regulations. 
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18. Matthews submitted more that 100 pages of documents to the Receiver as support 
for his claim, but he knew that nothing in any of those documents specified a $100,000 
commission. 
19. As a licensed real estate professional, Matthews is charged with knowledge that 
an alleged oral promise of a commission is unenforceable as a matter of law under the statute of 
frauds. 
20. "[A] broker must be presumed to know that an oral contract of employment for 
rendition of services in negotiating a sale of real estate for a commission is invalid." Machan 
Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Development Co., 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
21. As a Utah-licensed real estate professional, Matthews is charged with knowledge 
that under the plain language of governing Utah broker commission statutes, he was strictly 
prohibited from pursuing a claim in his own name against Olympus for a real estate commission. 
22. In Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, ] 23, the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court finding of "bad faith' under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 because the claims 
plaintiff was asserting "had been sold by the bankruptcy trustee to Defendants in compliance 
with the order of the United States Bankruptcy Court." 
23. A bad faith finding is appropriate when the "plaintiff knew of the sale and 
participated without objection in it , . . . sufficient to raise the inference of bad faith on plaintiffs 
part." Id. 
24. In Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998), the trial court found 
that the plaintiffs pursued their claims with "no other apparent reason than to harass . . . and/or to 
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drive up the costs o f litigation," and the Si lpreme G n n I I leld that 1 he finding v\ as enough to 
satisfy the "bad faith" element o f Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
[ Jta h case la w si ipports a concli ision in this ca se that thel\ tat the1 \ s Claim was not 
asserted or pursued in good faith, because Matthews' presumed knowledge of Utah law 
respecting commiss i . • J -ws.ii* ,-. ommission collections, and his materially false sworn 
statements, are "certainly sufficient to raise the inference of bad faith," and because Matthews 
lias pursued IJJS claiin for 'no other apparent reason" than to "drive up the costs of litigation" in 
trying to recover a claim he knew he was not entitled to pursue. Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 
'I in K 1 1 11 i J i _» i n
 L • ' . • • ' • . • • 
"!() The actions taken by Matthews in support of his v'l.iii Vi v n r ^ I r l v lot llirpuvpow. 
o f causing delay and needless ly increasing the costs o f this litigation. 
2 7. Each o f the requirements of*'t >!. . .-. *< .- • "^  '"-^ * :v* h-ep .:i;.-f\ '. 
28 Each o f the requirements o f Utah R.Civ.P. 56(g) have been satisfied. 
z: !\\ : . . -t : - T T M ' , I ^ — r . ^ . i ' . \ > . .::"*!*.' . . . « M " J V > '',;•• *;,, . . in 
defending against the Matthews Claim. 
;
. l U I I i D t h i s ^ day of Ma>, JUII6. • . • ; ' ,'; . . 
BYTHECOURT 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW CONCERNING RECEIVER'S MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY FEES RELATING TO CLAIM OF DAVID C. MATTHEWS was mailed first 
class and electronically emailed on this 5~' day of May, 2006, to each of the following: 
Dwayne A. Vance vance@millervance.com 
2200 North Park Avenue, #D200 
P.O. Box 682800 
Park City, UT 84068 
Rick L. Knuth rknuth@joneswaldo.com 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main #1500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Darryl J. Lee djlee@woodcrapo.com 
Wood Crapo LLC 
60 East South Temple #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
To the Court: 
janeth@email.utcourts.gov 
873755vl 
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